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[Crim. No. 6999.

In Bank.

May 17, 1962.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL KEHN
HiBLER, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery. Evidence in a murder case that defendant and his confederate
entered the store of a total stranger with a loaded gun at the
ready, walked to the cash rrgi ster and shot the proprietor when
he emerged from under the counter shows overt acts toward
committing a robbery that clearly justify an inference that
there was a specific intent to commit that crime. Such intent
may be established by the circumstances surrounding defendant's actions.
[2] Id.-Evidence-Killing in Perpetration of Robbery.-An inference in a murder case that defendant intended to commit robbery when he entered a store with a loaded gun and shot the
proprietor was supported by evidence of his subsequent participation with the same confederate in a robbery in another
city.
[3] Id.-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.-Wh er e no
evidence was offered in It lllunlt'r case to show that defendant
enteren the store of the victim for any purpose other than
r obbcry and it was difficult to conceive of any other purpose,
the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on second
degree murder.
[4] Criminal Law-Evidence-Identity.-An extrajudicial identification is admissible, n ot only to corroborate an identification
lJ\ade at the trial, hut as independent e,idence of identity.
[5] Id.-Evidence-Identity.-A picture or drawing embodying a
representation of a witness' extrajudicial declarations of the
[1] See Cal.Jl:r.2d, H om iciJe, §§ 17:2, 177: Am.Jur., Homicid",
§ 468.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Homicide, § 145(5); [3] Homicidt!,
§ 183; [4, 5] Crimjnal Law, § 374; [ 6] Jury, § 103 (7); [7] Witnesses, § 195: [8] Witlle s~es , § 1·19; [9] Criminal L aw, § 1447;
[10] Criminal Law, § 632.
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killer's physical charact('ristics is admissible in a murder case
for the purpose of identification.
[6] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-Counsel
for defendant in a capital case has the right to inquire into
a prospective juror's views on capital punishment, but this
right was not infringed where counsel asked the juror whether
he knew that an organization to which the juror belonged
advocated the death penalty, to which the juror answered that
he did not, at which point an objection was sustained as to the
form of the question only, counsel was then allowed to question
the juror on his personal beliefs as opposed to those of the
organization, and thereafter passed the juror for cause.
[7] Witnesses-Impeachment-Mental Condition.-Defendant in a
murder case was not prejudiced by asserted restrictions on
his counsel's attempt to impeach an identification witness for
lack of mental capacity where the trial court allowed counsel
the greatest latitude in his cross-examination, he was allowed
to question the witness about commitment to mental institutions despite the fact that the most recent commitment was
more than 10 years before the trial, and counsel also asked
a number of questions regarding recent treatment for mental
disorder and the answers were negative.
[8] Id.-Cross-examination-Identification of Accused.-Defendant's counsel in a murder case was not unduly hampered in
his cross-examination in assertedly not being allowed to show
that at the police lineup the witnesses were uncertain in identifying defendant and that they discussed among themselves
whether he was the right man, where the record revealed that
the defense was allowed to explore the matter as thoroughly
as desired, that the answers elicited were damaging to the
defense, and that the objections sustained by the court were
primarily to the form of questions asked.
[9] Criminal Law-Appeal-Reversal-Grounds.-Although defendant should have been taken before the magistrate on a
murder charge within the time limit prescribed in Pen. Code,
§ 825, the failure to do so was not a ground for reversing the
conviction where he \,as legally in custody at this time because
he had pleaded guilty to a robbery.
[10] ld.-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Phase of Case.-Though
the prosecutor in his argument to the jury in a murder case
discussed the deterrent effect of the death penalty, such discussipn was not prejudicial where it was temperate and restrained and was only a brief and minor part of his argument.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Jury, § 50.
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APPEAIJ, automa tica1ly tah n ullcl er P en. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b ) , from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County a nd from an order d enying a new trial. Mark
Brandler, Judge. Affirmed .
Prosecution for murder and for assault with a d eadly
wea pon with intent to commit murd er . Judgment of cOll\'iction imposing the death p enal ty on th e murder count, affirmed.
Gregory S. Stout, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for D ef endant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James and
Gilbert F . Nelson, A ssistant Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.--Def ellc1ant was convicted of first degree
murder and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
commit murder. The jury fixed the penalty at d eath , and the
trial court d eni ed defendant's motion for a new trial. This
ap peal is automatic. (P en. Code, § 1239, subd. (b) .)
On the evening of J anuary 4, 1961, two m en entered a Los
Angeles grocery store owned by Morris Hassen. They walked
to the check stand where Mr. Hassen was leaning down dusting liquor bottles. Mrs. Hassen, who was standing nearby,
testified that she moved to the check stand to wait on the
men, that as she did so she noticed her husband getting up
f rom behind the st and and that" by the look of his f ace" she
could see that something was wrong. 'Vhen she bent down
to ask what the trouble was, she saw a gun prot ruding from
the coat of the man subsequently identified by other witnesses
as defendant . A moment later the gun discharged, fatally
wounding Mr. Hassen. The men turned, walked from the
store, and departed in different directions.
At the trial d ef endant denied participating in the crime.
His defense consisted primarily of an alibi and impeachment
of the identification witnesses. The evidence, ho"ever, was
more than sufficient to establish that he did the shooting.
Although Mrs. Hassen was unable to see his fa ce bec ause his
hat was tilted . !She was able to identify the hat and coat he
was wearing. She identified the second man from police photographs as Leonard Lingo, who was killed 10 days after the
shooting when he accompanied d efendant on an armed robbery
in P omona.
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Alfred Costello, an identification witness, was walking on
the opposite side of the street when his attention was attracted
to the store by two men standing at the cash register. When
he heard a shot he crossed the street to investigate, <lnd in a
lighted area in front of the store and at a distance between
8 and 12 feet, he viewed defendant who was still wearing the
hat and coat and still carrying a gun. According to Costello,
defendant turned into an alley, dropped his hat, and began to
run. Costello gave cbase. Defendant paused in the alley
under a light as if "trying to make up his mind whether to
go right or left," and Costello was able to see him without
the hat at a distance between 15 and 20 feet. Defendant then
fired a shot that hit a wall behind Costello, discarded his coat,
and fled through a parking lot. Costello retrieved the coat and
discovered a gun in it identified by a ballistics expert as the
murder weapon. Costello positively identified defendant as
the man he had pursued.
Alonzo Dunlap, an attendant at the parking lot through
which defendant escaped, testified that he got a side and front
view of defendant as he walked through the illuminated lot.
Although Dunlap did not hear any shots, his testimony otherwise corroborated Costello's testimony.
Billy Hillen, a third witness, was leaving the market when
defendant and Lingo entered. He testified that he got a good
look at both men, and he identified defendant's hat and coat.
Wben Hillen had walked only a few steps from the store, he
heard a shot and turned around. He again looked closely at
the two men as they left the store, and observed defendant
holding a gun. Hillen had no difficulty in picking defendant
out of a lineup at police headfluarters, anel he also identified
defendant at the trial.
Defendant testified that he spent the evening of the shooting in yarious bars with Jerry Mayes, Robert Mahon, and two
men whose names he could not recall, and that he was also
accompanied by a girl named Ann at the bar where he claimed
to be at the time of the killing. Only Mayes could be located
to testify in defendant's behalf, although an investigator
attached to the public defender 's office attempted to trace the
others. Mayes, who was in custody for accompanying defendant and Lingo on the Pomona robbery, corroborated defendant's testimony on all but minor points. On erossexamination, however, he admitted that "It's hard to be certain" that the evening he recalled was the night of the
murder. Dewitt Lightner, a police officer, testified that he
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liad asked defemlant if he had auy alibi that could be checked
out, and that defendant replied in effect that he could not
account for his time, but that he was probably drinking at the
Four Aces Bar, and that he also said there was no one with
him who could account for his time.
Defeuuant contends that even if the evidence was sufficient
to sustain a finding that he was the killer, it did not demonstrate that a robbery was being perpetrated that would make
the killing murder in the first degree. (Pen. Code, § 189 ;
People v. Goefield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 868 [236 P.2d 570].) The
only instructions given to the jury on degrees of murder
were: "Murder is classified into two degrees, that of murder
in the first degree anu that of murder in the second degree"
and" All murder which is committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate robbery is murder of the first degree."
The court also defined robbery and attempt. Admittedly,
there was no evidence that defendant or Lingo demanded
money of the deceased or that they took money after the
killing'. Indeed, since defendant asserted thr oughout the
trial that he was not the killer, there was no explanation why
thc gun discharged. [1] The evidence establishes, however,
that defendant and his confederate entered the store of a total
stranger with a loaded gun at the ready; they walked to the
cash register and shot the proprietor when he emerged from
under the counter. These were overt acts toward committing
a robbery that clearly justify an inference that there was a
specific intent to commit that crime. Such intent may he
established by the circumstances surrounding a defendant's
actions. (People v. Je1~nillgs, 158 Cal.App.2d 159, 165-166
[322 P.2d 19] ; see People v. Hubler, 102 Cal.App.2d 689, 695
[228 P .2d 37]; State Y. Burnett, 37 Wn.2d 619 [225 P.2d
416, 417-418].) [2] The inference that defendant inteHdcd to
commit robbery is also supported by his subsequent participation with Lingo in the robbery in Pomona, evidence of
which was admitted without objection and indeed elicited in
part by the defense. (See People v. Goefield, supra, at pp.
869-870; People v. Peete, 28 Ca1.2d 306, 315-316 [169 P.2d
9~4] ; 7 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 463.)
[3] There was no evidence
offered tending ta show that defendant entered the store for
any purpose other than robbery, and it is difficult to conceive of any other purpose. The trial court, therefore, did not
err in failing to instruct on second degree murder. (People
v. Green, 13 Ca1.2d 37, 44 [87 P .2d 821] ; People v. Lloyrl,
98 Cal.App.2d 305, 311 [220 P.2t1 10] ; People v. Sameniego,
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118 Cal.App. 165, 170-171 [4 P.2d 800, 5 P.2d 653]; see
People v. Moran, 18 Cal.App. 209 [122 P. 969].)
Defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting hcarsay cvidence. Before defendant was taken into custody a police artist made a drawing of
the killer as described by the witness Costello. The picture
was modified later, following suggestions of Costello and
other witnesses. At trial, Costello was shown the picture,
and he identified it. The picture was first admitted into evidence without objection, but defendant's counsel was later
allowed to interpose the objections of lack of foundation and
immateriality. The picture was again admitted. Although
the picture was a representation of extrajudicial declarations
of the witness regarding the killer's physical characteristics,
Costello, the police artist, and other identification witnesses
all testified and were cross-examined on the matter. (See
People v. Gould, 54 Ca1.2d 621, 626 [354 P.2d 865] ; Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers, 62 Harv.L.Rev.177, 192-193.) [4] "[A]n
extrajudicial identification is admissible, not only to corroborate an identification made at the trial [citation], but as independent evidence of identity." (People v. Gould, supra.)
[5] Similarly this pictorial embodiment of a physical description is admissible for that purpose. The defense attempted to show that Costello identified defendant at a police
lineup only after he had heard the other witnesses do so.
The implication that he could not make a certain identification
could be offset by showing that he had previously described
defendant with sufficient accuracy that an artist could construct a reasonable likeness of defendant after other witnesses made minor corrections.
[6] Defendant asserts that his counsel was unduly restricted in his voir dire examination of a prospective juror
regarding the juror's views on capital punishment. Counsel
has the right to inquire into the juror's opinions on the
subject (People v. H1Lghes, ante, pp. 89, 96 [17 Cal.Rptr.
617, 367 P.2d 33]), but the record reveals that this right
was not infringed. Defendant's counsel asked the juror
whether he knew that an organization to which the juror
belonged advocated retaining the death penalty. The juror
answered that he did not, and at this point an objection was
sustained as to the form of the question only. Counsel was
then allowcd to question the juror on his personal beliefs as
opposed to those of the organization. Apparently counsel
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was satisfied with the answers, for he passed the juror for
cause.
[7] There is no merit in defendant's contcntion that he
was prejudiced by restrictions on his counsel's attempt to
impeach the witness Costello on the ground he lacked mental
capacity. The trial court allowed counsel the greatest latitude
in his cross-examination. He was allowed to question Costello
about commitment to mental institutions despite the fact that
the most recent commitment was more than 10 years before
the trial. Counsel also asked a number of questions regarding
recent treatment for mental disorder, and the answers were
negative.
[8] Equally without merit is defendant's contention that
he was not allowed to show that at the police lineup the witnesses were uncertain in identifying him and that they discussed among themselves whether he was the right man. The
record reveals that the defense was allowed to explore the
matter as thoroughly as desired and that the answers elicited
were damaging to the defense. The objections sustained by
the court were primarily to the form of questions asked. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that counsel was unduly
hampered in his cross-examination.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's objections were
so numerous that defense counsel was unable properly to conduct his case. Twice during the trial counsel objected to the
court that he "as being unduly harassed. The record, however, discloses no such harassment and indicates that the
defense was permitted to present any relevant evidence it
had.
[9] Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because he was taken into custody on January 14,
1961, but was not informed of the charges against him until
the following February 14. Defendant was legally in custody
during this time becanse he had pleaded guilty to the robbery
in Pomona. Although he should have been taken before the
magistrate on the murder charge within the time limit prescribed in Penal Code section 825, the failure to do so is not
a ground for rewrsing the conviction. ( Rogers v. Superior
Court, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 9-10 [291 P.2d 929] .)
[10] Finally, 'defendant contends that nnder People v.
Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 731-732 [17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2d 33,
809], he is entitled to a new trial on the penalty imposed
because of the prosecutor's argument to the jury as to the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. The prosecutor's discus-
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sion in that regard, offered to the jury as "another factor you
can consider," was temperate and restrained and was only a
brief and minor part of his argument. The error was therefore
not prejudicial. (People v. Gar'ncr, ante, pp. 135, 156 [18
Cal.Rptr. 40,367 P.2d 680].)
The judgment and order denying defendant's motion for a
new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J ., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

